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 Introduction 
Over its history, Cambridge has had a notable impact on the methodology of economics, and it is 
the purpose of this chapter to chart and discuss this contribution. We focus on some central 
methodological themes: the aims and scope of economics, how to deal with the limitations of both 
pure induction and pure deduction as a basis for an economic methodology; the appropriate nature 
and role of assumptions, of mathematical deduction and of real experience; the place of moral 
considerations in economic theory. Methodology is understood as arising from epistemology and 
ontology, so we will include philosophy in our coverage. Indeed it is in providing philosophical 
foundations that a significant part of the Cambridge contribution lies. Since ontology entails an 
understanding of the subject matter of economics, methodology is seen as encompassing also a 
view on the scope of economics.  
By contribution we will mean explicit methodological (or philosophical) analysis by Cambridge 
economists and its effect on the methodological analysis of others, whether or not the effect 
involved a misinterpretation of the original analysis. While Cambridge has seen a wide range of 
methodological practice and of theoretical contributions which embodied distinctive implicit 
methodological positions, we only consider explicit references to methodology. Even then the 
coverage is inevitably limited, not least because of the number of major figures who have been 
based at Cambridge and the wide reach of Cambridge’s influence through the international spread 
of its former students.  
Further, the development of philosophical and methodological thought alongside theoretical 
developments has been a complex process; the interpretations offered here inevitably gloss over 
much of that complexity. Particular emphasis is placed on interpretations emanating from 
Cambridge. The focus will be on some common threads which could be said to constitute a 
Cambridge tradition in economic methodology.2 Martins’s (2013) remarkable study makes the 
case (with reference to philosophical foundations) that there has been a revival in Cambridge of 
the political economy tradition of Smith and Ricardo. Here rather we start with the older political 
economy tradition in Cambridge, starting with Newton’s experimental method, and consider 
contributions to methodology which could be seen as deviations from this Cambridge tradition, as 
                                                          
1 This chapter has benefitted from helpful comments and suggestions from Geoff Harcourt. 
2 See Dow, Dow, Hutton and Keaney (1998) for a discussion of what constitutes a ‘tradition’ in economic thought. 
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well as more recent revival of the older methodological tradition. In the process we trace the 
evolution of Cambridge’s contribution of a ‘third way’ approach to methodology. 
We consider first the Cambridge philosophical tradition as it existed at the emergence of classical 
political economy at the end of the eighteenth century, focusing in particular on mathematics, since 
it provides the background to Malthus’s methodological contribution in his debates with Ricardo. 
The Methodenstreit then provides the context for the publication of J N Keynes’s Scope and 
Method of Political Economy at the time of Marshall’s launching of political economy at 
Cambridge as a discipline separated from economic history. The older Newtonian Cambridge 
tradition resumed its influence with J M Keynes’s Treatise on Probability, which is discussed in 
relation to contemporary Cambridge philosophy and in terms of the subsequent methodology of 
his economics. Keynes’s followers in the ‘Circus’ were more explicit on the subject of 
methodology, in a tradition continued and developed by Cambridge scholars up to the present day 
working outside the mainstream methodology tradition which now dominates the Faculty of 
Economics and Politics. It will be argued that keeping alive discussion of the philosophy of 
economics has been as important a contribution as particular philosophies of economics.   
The Cambridge Philosophical Tradition and classical political economy 
The Cambridge figure who arguably had the most profound influence on the methodology of 
political economy as it emerged in the eighteenth century was Newton, whom Keynes (1946: 363) 
called ‘Cambridge’s greatest son’.3 The scientific methodology he developed, as understood in 
Cambridge, had a distinctive character which carried over to subsequent developments in 
economic methodology in Cambridge. His experimental method for natural science involved 
analysis of experimental results leading to synthesis in the form of general principles in a process 
of abduction. These principles were provisional, allowing for the possibility that subsequent 
experiments might confound them, requiring reformulation. This methodology had several key 
features: it was realist in requiring a grounding in real experience with a purpose of uncovering 
real causal mechanisms, it was cautious as to the truth-value of general principles, and these 
principles were open to revision in the light of new experience and took the form of tendencies 
rather than laws (Montes 2006).  
 
For Descartes, in contrast, reason was primary, generating propositions by means of deductive 
logic with certainty (assuming the premises to be self-evidently true). These propositions could 
then take the form of natural laws, with empirical evidence only being sought for purposes of 
confirmation. The other counterpoint to Newton’s influence was the empiricist position that the 
only source of knowledge was induction from enumeration of repeated instances. Newton’s 
abductive methodology thus followed a path between the two extremes of pure deductivism and 
pure inductivism, involving a logic of induction through the mental process of identifying 
patterns.4 Keynes’s (1946) essay on Newton was explicit that he was neither a rationalist nor an 
empiricist.5 Keynes (1946: 365) drew attention to the role of Newton’s mind in forming 
                                                          
3 Newton’s thought of course had its own antecedents, but we begin the account with him. 
4 See Loasby (2003) for a discussion of theorising along these lines, with particular reference to Smith’s theory of 
mind. 
5 There may be an autobiographical overlay to Keynes’s interpretation, but if so this would reinforce the view that 
Keynes saw himself reinvigorating a Cambridge methodological tradition. 
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hypotheses, maintaining that he conducted experiments to provide evidence for what he already 
knew intuitively.6 As Comim (2006: 129) puts it, ‘the Newtonian system is neither an imagined 
construct nor a collections of haphazard empirical laws but something that transcends both’. This 
Newtonian middle way methodology, or via media, was to prove characteristic of a distinctive 
strand of methodological thinking in Cambridge which continues to evolve to the present day. 
 
Martins (2013:  ch. 5) discusses the difference between Newton and Descartes’s methodologies as 
lying in their approaches to mathematics. While Newton relied on classical geometry as separate 
from arithmetic, Descartes combined the two in analytical geometry. While for Newton 
geometrical argument related directly to real experience, arithmetic (algebraic) operations did not 
necessarily do so, as in the irrational numbers. Similarly the calculus generated infinitesimally 
small numbers as well as infinity and points, which again have no real counterpart; yet they could 
be identified with respect to Cartesian coordinates. For Newton it was important that mathematical 
argument correspond to real experience, building on common sense understandings. To the extent 
that this mathematical tradition continued in Cambridge in the education of economists, it 
influenced the methodology of the emerging Classical tradition there.  
 
For the development of political economy at Cambridge we need first to look to the methodological 
approach underpinning the emergence of political economy in Scotland, where Newton’s influence 
was profound. As Montes (2006) and Comim (2006) show, Scottish Enlightenment thinkers shared 
the Cambridge understanding of Newton, rather than the rationalist continental understanding of 
him. Hume and Smith in particular were great admirers of Newton and sought to apply his 
methodology to the emerging field of political economy, while being explicitly critical of 
Descartes’ methodology. Further Hume’s resolution to the problems both with deductivism and 
inductivism provided a philosophical justification for Newton’s methodology. Newton’s approach 
to mathematics fed through to Scottish political economy mediated through the Scottish 
philosophy of common sense – a via media which required mathematical concepts to have their 
origin in sense data, while allowing abstraction in the form of simplification (Olson 1971), as well 
as paying due regard to ordinary experience (Comim 2002). This common sense philosophy was 
to re-emerge in Cambridge with G E Moore (1925) and his influence on Keynes (Coates 1996).  
For political economy, experiments consisted of extensive historical study of different real 
contexts, from which patterns emerged with the assistance of the imagination and use of metaphor 
and analogy, from which provisional generalisations might be formed. The aim was to employ the 
imagination in order to formulate provisional generalisations about underlying causal tendencies, 
knowing that the scope for knowledge was limited by the complexity of social systems (Hume’s 
problem of induction). The form of history used for providing experimental evidence was thus 
analytical, or conjectural, history (supporting for example a stages approach to socio-economic 
history) rather than the recounting of instances. Finally, like Newton, the aim for Hume was to 
develop theoretical reasoning which could be reconciled with ‘vulgar’ (non-specialist7) 
understanding (Comim 2006: 126). For Smith (1762-63) this reconciliation was a necessary 
                                                          
6 Hartley wrote to Keynes in response to his paper on Newton, noting the similarities with Faraday’s methodology 
which he had earlier described as follows: ‘In the period of his great achievements, his experiments were rarely 
continuous, the intervals between them suggesting the subconscious working of his mind. He waited until the impulse 
came and his “prescient wisdom” had planned the experiment and foreseen the result’ (as quoted in Kuehn 2012).  
7 This meaning differs from the Marxist use of the term to refer to non-Marxist economics. 
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element of the scientist’s rhetoric of persuasion (in the absence of demonstrative proof) and reflects 
a concern for science to be problem-oriented and to have practical application. It also reflected the 
common sense philosophy which supports the continued reliance on common sense beliefs unless 
there is good reason to abandon them.  
 
Scottish political economy in turn influenced the development of political economy at Cambridge. 
If we take Keynes’s (1933: 79) suggestion that Paley might be considered the first of the 
Cambridge economists, Waterman (1996) makes the case that, as Paley’s thinking progressed, he 
was increasingly influenced by Scottish political economy. Keynes (1933: 71) otherwise gave 
priority to Malthus as ‘the first Cambridge economist’. Malthus is of particular interest, given his 
explicit contributions to methodology. It was under the influence of Scottish political economy as 
well as what was still a Newtonian mathematics education at Cambridge that Malthus developed 
his theory of population.8 His methodological position was most clear in the context of his debates 
with Ricardo (Cremaschi and Dascal 1996). The focal point of these disagreements lay in 
Malthus’s belief ‘in the impossibility of reducing human needs and tastes to mathematical figures’, 
leading Ricardo to criticise Malthus as being ‘unscientific’ (Cremaschi and Dascal 1996: 479). 
Like Smith, Malthus was doubtful of the accuracy of measures of value, for example, as well as 
the dangers of premature generalisation.  
 
Malthus did allow for some laws of human nature (e.g. the need for food and shelter and attraction 
between the sexes) and of the natural sciences, but otherwise the laws of political economy are 
only probable and open to exceptions, given the complexity of social systems. He pursued a 
Newtonian via media in his political economy, between the extremes of oversimplifying the 
subject matter by mathematising political economy with inattention to evidence, on the one hand, 
and assuming that surface appearances are causes, on the other. He also pursued a middle way 
with respect to language, criticising Ricardo for an undue separation between ordinary language 
and scientific language, while at the same time allowing for some specialist language to be 
developed with care in the interests of clarity. Here Malthus is seen to pursue the realist 
Newtonian/Humean agenda of reconciling specialist with non-specialist understanding, while 
Ricardo pursued a rationalist interpretation of Newton (Cremaschi and Dascal 1996).  
 
Meanwhile John Stuart Mill was coming to dominate the agenda for Classical economics, adopting 
a methodology which is characterised both as deductivist (for discovery) and inductivist (for 
justification); each operation required the ‘atomic hypothesis’, so that each was the logical 
counterpart of the other (Carabelli 1988: 77, 239). He was challenged in this by the Cambridge 
polymath, William Whewell, who developed a philosophy of science along the lines of a middle 
way between continental deductivism and English empiricism. Whewell’s inductivism involved 
innate ideas, or ‘conceptions’, and thus the operation of the mind, being applied to observation. 
He was a realist in that observation was an essential element of discovery, and theory was 
provisional: the conceptions themselves required checking against further observation. Among the 
areas of application of his philosophy of science was political economy. Whewell is notable for 
reformulating Ricardian theory by developing the ‘earliest systematic application of mathematical 
symbols of political economy in England’, seeing algebra as a preferable ‘language’ to the 
arithmetic of classical economics (Campanelli 2008: 741, emphasis in original). Nevertheless he 
                                                          
8 However Olson (1971) argues that analytical mathematics were increasingly influencing thinking at Cambridge by 
the second half of the eighteenth century. 
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criticised the departure of Ricardo’s deductivist theorising from real experience, which for 
Whewell was the proper starting point for ‘conceptions’ and reasoning; he also doubted the 
capacity of mathematics to deal with humanity in the round, including the moral dimension (see 
further Snyder 2006: 279-85 and Harcourt and Kriesler forthcoming). Others at Cambridge who 
were concerned with political economy, such as Sidgwick, also engaged in methodological debate, 
seeking a balance between the deductive and inductive approaches (Schultz 2008), although 
Edgeworth promoted the deductivist approach as being more akin to the methodology of the 
physical sciences (Creedy 2008).  
 
While there was thus debate in Britain concerning the nature and role of deduction and induction, 
with Cambridge playing an important part in attempts to promote a Newtonian middle way, the 
methodological debate on the continent was more polarised in terms of a dualistic understanding 
of deduction and induction. The arguments between the Austrian pure theorists and the German 
historical school became known as the Methodenstreit, or methodological struggle. Alfred 
Marshall sought to defuse the struggle in order to enhance the standing of economics as a 
discipline. For Harcourt ([2003]2012: 201), Marshall is the initiator of the political economy 
tradition. 
 
 
The Cambridge resolution of the Methodenstreit  
 
Marshall was not inclined to engage in methodological debate, and yet his methodological 
approach arguably had a great impact. This impact is divided between those (non-mainstream) 
economists who focus on his professed methodology and his analysis of evolutionary contexts (as 
in industrial districts for example), on the one hand, and those (mainstream) economists who have 
pursued the deductivist methodology he used in his formal theoretical marginal analysis, on the 
other. Groenewegen (1995: 415) quotes Marshall, in a letter to J N Keynes, as follows: ‘I take an 
extreme position as to the method & scope of economics. In my new book I say of methods simply 
that economics has to use every method known to science’ (emphasis in original). This pluralist 
methodology included a particular view of mathematics which followed in the Newtonian-
Scottish-Malthusian methodological tradition. First, the emphasis was on geometry rather than 
algebra or calculus. Second, mathematics was not to be used as an engine of enquiry, but rather as 
a substitute for verbal argument to be set aside when communicating theories with the aid of real-
life examples. This reflected both that, like Hume, he sought to make connections across the 
learned-vulgar divide and his view that political economy had a human and concrete nature.  
 
Marshall’s evolutionary view of the subject matter limited the scope for general laws arrived at 
either by pure deduction or pure induction. Marshall explicitly argued against ‘economic man’ as 
an appropriate basis on which to build theory, on the grounds of its contradiction by observation. 
Deductivists in contrast proceeded by accepting the concept of economic man as ‘self-evident’, 
and as fruitful given the scope for application of marginalist analysis on the basis of this 
conception. Marshall’s evolutionary view required him to engage in detailed study of real social 
contexts in order to grasp the nature of particular evolutions. Yet, for all his use of historical 
evidence, Marshall was critical of the English historical school’s empiricism (pure inductivism) 
on the grounds that the evolutionary nature of the subject matter precluded identification of 
6 
 
permanent uniformities (Groenewegen 1995: 310). It was rather Hegelian analytical history9 which 
he saw as playing an important methodological role, whereby the operation of the mind was 
brought to the identification of conjectural patterns in history. From Hegel too he absorbed the 
organicist idea of the whole being more than the sum of the parts. 
 
The presentation of the Principles thus involved a methodology which differed in important 
respects from the other builders of the marginalist revolution. Yet it was those elements of the 
content of the Principles which were most consistent with the development of marginalism 
elsewhere, rather than Marshall’s professed methodology, which had the greatest impact on 
economics as a whole. Indeed Whitaker (2008: 364) argues that ‘his method was in the general 
deductive tradition of John Stuart Mill’. His key theoretical contributions as far as most economists 
are concerned were the conceptual framework he developed for marginalist comparative static 
analysis of exchange, which spawned theoretical developments, generating law-like conclusions 
about the consequences of atomistic individual behaviour. For Marshall, perfect competition and 
laissez-faire were intended simply as starting points for the analysis, but that became the 
benchmark for the bulk of mainstream analysis.  
 
The fact that Marshall’s methodology has been open to conflicting interpretations is due in large 
part to the conflict between the methodology implicit in much if his theorising and the 
methodology he professed (Pratten 1998). But, whatever his impact on methodology (intended or 
unintended), Marshall is also important for his indirect methodological contributions. First is the 
part he played in establishing the Economics and Politics Tripos at Cambridge and of moving 
economics from the Moral Sciences Board, with profound effects on the future development of 
economics at Cambridge. In promoting the idea of economics as a mature discipline, Marshall put 
great emphasis on continuity of ideas (as in the first Preface to the Principles), rather than 
discontinuities. As a result he distracted attention from the ways in which his own methodology 
differed from the other approaches in Britain and further afield. 
 
It was in this respect that Marshall is also important for promoting his protégé, John Neville 
Keynes, the father of John Maynard Keynes. Keynes’s methodological treatise, The Scope and 
Method of Political Economy, served to support Marshall’s efforts to establish economics as a 
discipline (Deane 1983)10 and has had an impact on the wider discipline which continues to this 
day. For J N Keynes, the subject matter of economics was wealth. ‘By economic activities are 
meant those human activities that direct themselves towards the creation, appropriation, and 
accumulation of wealth; and by economic customs and institutions, the customs and institutions 
of human society in regard to wealth’ (J N Keynes 1904: 2). This definition is not inconsistent 
with the Classical view of economics’s scope as production, distribution and exchange, or 
Marshall’s (1890: 14) more vague ‘ordinary business of life’. But Keynes’s definition was to be 
superseded by the Robbins definition in terms of scarcity, which diverted attention from customs 
and institutions to rational choice and deductivist methodology. 
 
But a particular understanding of his methodology itself has had lasting impact. In fact to the extent 
that mainstream economics textbooks start with a methodological statement, it includes a version 
                                                          
9 There is a parallel with the Scottish analytical history tradition which can arguably traced through Hegel, but it was 
Hegel who was the direct influence on Marshall (Groenewegen 1995, Martins 2013). 
10 Keynes has been seen as setting out a rationalisation of Marshall’s methodology (Whitaker 2008). 
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of J N Keynes’s position on method. Keynes set out a hypothetico-deductivist methodology, which 
seemed to reconcile the two opposing positions of deductivism and inductivism. This was achieved 
by treating each as the counterpart of the other, such that rational argument was used for discovery 
while empirical evidence was used for confirmation of conclusions. But for Keynes induction was 
not the logical process in the Newtonian tradition of applying the mind to experience, but rather 
the collection of evidence on repeated instances of constant conjunctions of events. Rather than 
the transcendent middle way of the Cambridge tradition, therefore, this was simply a synthesis of 
deductivism and inductivism within a positivist logical framework. 
  
Keynes’s methodological analysis was well-suited to seeking a synthetic solution to the 
Methodenstreit, being carefully worded and heavily qualified and thus open to a range of 
interpretations. But Keynes’s emphasis was much more on the side of deductivism (Deane 1983, 
Moore 2003), not least because of his stated aim to identify uniformities (albeit with the ceteris 
paribus qualifier). Keynes did see evidence as having importance for confirming not only 
theoretical propositions but also the assumptions on which they are based. Like Marshall, Keynes 
had doubts about the concept of economic man. But the tendency was for this (realist, Cambridge) 
aspect of his methodology to be ignored. Once the rational choice assumptions were widely taken 
as uniformly supported by evidence (or self-evidently true), they seemed no longer to require 
confirmation; they could therefore provide a universal basis for hypotheses. By trying to set out a 
synthesis of competing methodological positions, Keynes ended up downplaying Marshall’s 
emphasis on real evidence, encouraging the deductivist reading of Marshall and supporting the 
rising tide of deductivist marginal analysis. Inductive argument was effectively limited to testing 
theories. Although presented as a middle way, in fact Keynes’s hypothetico-deductive 
methodology encouraged a deductivist approach to establishing hypotheses. 
 
This influence was reinforced by J N Keynes’s discussion of the distinction between positive, 
normative and applied economics (which he had earlier identified as characteristic of the 
deductivist position). While Hume had already distinguished the first two concepts, J N Keynes 
went much further in positing that a value-free economics was possible, to which values could 
later be added.11 As Deane (2008) points out, this was a device to insulate the ‘hard scientific core 
of economic theory … from the charges of ideological bias, or immorality, or relativity, as well as 
from failures in practical economic policies’. But as a result Keynes provided a rationale for 
deductivist methodology which could be presented as if value-free.  
 
By supporting Marshall’s drive to establish economics as a mature discipline, with intellectual 
continuity and methodological consensus, J N Keynes had helped to suppress important 
methodological issues and provided a foundation for Mill’s increasingly dominant approach. 
Indeed many at Cambridge proceeded within that framework. But, while it would seem that an 
important Cambridge contribution to economic methodology was to develop and promote a 
methodology which had emerged elsewhere, the next generation of Cambridge economists 
                                                          
11 Colander (1992) has revived this framework in order to argue for a pluralist methodology for applied economics, 
but where the theory to be applied is positive, and derived by means of deductive logic. ‘The art of economics is 
applied economics. It relates the lessons learned in positive economics to the normative goals determined in normative 
economics’ (Colander 1992: 192). 
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departed from the apparent consensus and made a series of influential contributions to 
methodology which can be traced back to the older Cambridge tradition.12  
 
 
J M Keynes and methodology in twentieth-century Cambridge 
 
The leading figure of this new generation was J N Keynes’s son, J M Keynes, who came to 
economics from the philosophy of mathematics. His explicit contributions to economic 
methodology were, as for Marshall, spasmodic rather than the kind of focused study his father 
undertook. Yet his distinctive methodology, as set out by Shackle (1974), Chick (1983: ch. 2) and 
Harcourt (1987), has had a profound influence on Post Keynesian economics. The philosophical 
foundations of this methodology became a significant field of study, beginning with the path-
breaking work of Meeks (1976), Carabelli (1988) and O’Donnell (1989). As Runde (1997: 240) 
points out, Keynes’s methodological position fell outside the positivist tradition which, as we have 
seen, was encouraged (however inadvertently) by his father. Nevertheless many of his 
methodological statements were expressed in the process of criticising the positivist mainstream, 
a phenomenon which has carried forward to modern-day heterodox economics.13  
 
Keynes’s earlier work on probability allows us to infer his philosophical approach when he came 
to economics, where his stated aim was not just methodological but epistemological: to 
‘revolutionise … the way the world thinks about economic problems’ (Keynes 1935). In A Treatise 
on Probability, Keynes explored the grounds for belief as the basis for action under the general 
conditions of uncertainty which followed from his organicism. Where structures evolve and the 
interactions between their components evolve (i.e. the atomic principle does not hold and the 
physical or social system is open), probabilities cannot be quantified. But rather than falling into 
the philosophical dual of certainty/ignorance, Keynes explored the realm of uncertainty, outlining 
the mechanisms by which more or less reliable knowledge may be established with more or less 
confidence. Keynes was thus updating Hume’s epistemology as a resolution to scepticism with 
respect to reason on the one hand and the problem of induction with respect to an organic system 
on the other. This was Keynes’s own version of the middle way, in the tradition of Newton (and 
Hume and Smith), whereby the mind identified patterns from experience; the resulting 
generalisations were provisional in the face of an organic system and, for application (the purpose 
of theory), required close reference to that evolving reality (Carabelli 1988: ch. 4, 5). These 
generalisations about tendencies were to be reasonable even if they could not be demonstrated to 
be true.  
 
Keynes explicitly challenged the prevailing positivist view of induction which involved gathering 
data on repeated instances (‘pure’ induction) as requiring empirical uniformity of nature. Rather 
he understood induction as being a logical process of employing negative analogy in order to 
uncover persistence in spite of difference. But Keynes departed from classical logic (which 
required certainty as to the truth of premises) and empirical logic (which required unambiguous 
                                                          
12 While Weintraub (2005) challenges the idea of a continuing Cambridge tradition stemming from Marshall, given 
the diversity of approaches within Cambridge, our focus here is on distinctive Cambridge contributions. What is 
emerging is that one such contribution is the continuing thread of a distinctive methodological approach stemming 
from Newton. 
13 See Gerrard (1997) for a comprehensive review of Keynes’s methodology. 
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facts). Keynes was thus diverging from the endeavours of Russell and (the early) Whitehead to 
build a complete mathematical system based on classical logic. His (human, or ordinary) logic was 
more suited to conditions of uncertainty. As with Hume’s epistemology, Keynes founded his logic 
on common sense and convention and he employed ordinary language.14  
Just as the scientist organises observations according to prior conceptualisations and patterns, so 
the individual or group in society has to apply judgement to observation. Keynes was quite explicit 
about the ambiguity of evidence this entails. He referred to direct knowledge based on experience 
in the following terms: ‘Sensations which we may be said to experience, the ideas of meanings, 
about which we have thoughts which we may be said to understand, and facts and characteristics 
or relations of sense-data, or meanings which we may be said to perceive’ (Keynes 1921, 12, 
emphasis in original). The theory of probability was thus subjective in the sense that the evidence 
brought to bear and its assessment in relation to other sources of knowledge involved judgement. 
But it was objective in the sense that anyone in the same circumstances and with the same 
understandings of the evidence would arrive at the same judgement.15  
When Keynes turned to economics, this epistemology had strong methodological implications 
(Chick 2003). First he regarded economics as an art. While the father had privileged deductive 
theory as the core of the discipline, with values imported later and ‘unscientific’ methods only 
introduced at the stage of policy application, the son privileged the art of application at the core. 
For him, the requirements of practical application determine the methodology of theory 
development and, given the open-system nature of the subject matter, that methodology was 
pluralist. Ordinary logic required multiple strands of reasoning and evidence which could lend 
weight to argument, for economists as well as economic agents. Keynes was therefore highly 
critical of the monist methodology of positivism (O’Donnell 1989: ch. 9).  
As with Marshall, Keynes’s ideas were then reduced by mainstream interpreters to their 
mathematical versions within a static equilibrium framework. Also like Marshall, Keynes himself 
used mathematical formulations, but only as a contributor to the overall argument. Keynes applied 
the same logic to the testing of theory by means of econometrics, a logic which he made explicit 
in his critique of Tinbergen. His primary critique was of econometric analysis which requires an 
invariant structure; he argued that the onus should be on the econometrician to demonstrate that a 
particular case reasonably approximated a fixed structure, so that regression analysis was 
warranted. O’Donnell (1997) shows that, as with his objections to mathematics, Keynes’s 
objections were to Tinbergen’s specific techniques in relation to the subject matter, not to 
econometrics per se. 
While rational economic man had increasingly taken hold as the axiomatic foundation of 
deductivist theory, Keynes was particularly critical of the fictional nature of the concept. In line 
with his organicist view of society, Keynes rejected an atomistic representation of economic 
agents. Rather he emphasised man’s social aspect, not least when it comes to epistemology and 
                                                          
14 This theme was developed by Shackle (1983: 116) for whom mathematics was insufficient, being too restrictive a 
language compared to verbal argument: ‘language at its full compass, where words are fingers touching the keyboard 
of a hearer’s mind’. 
15 On Keynes’s debate with Ramsey over subjectivity see Carabelli (1989: 96-7). 
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the reliance on social conventional knowledge. Here again Keynes pursues a middle way, made 
explicit in his movement away from the reason-emotion dual represented by Russell and Lawrence 
respectively (Keynes 1938). The methodological implications of this epistemology are most 
evident in Chapter 12 of The General Theory, where he analyses the determinants of the 
macroeconomic variable which was central to his theory of effective demand: investment (Runde 
1997). His objections to the rationality assumptions arose from philosophical argument rather than 
explicit evidence; consistent with his theory of probability, Keynes’s methodology centred on 
logic. Nevertheless his philosophy was founded in turn on an organicist ontology which arose in 
an inchoate way from ‘deep background’ experience (Searle 1995). While Keynes did not seek out 
evidence to the same systematic extent as Marshall, his human logic was informed by experience. 
 
Chick (2003) spells out further the connections between Keynes’s ontology and epistemology and 
his methodology.16 From the former he set out to develop an open theoretical system which was 
general in its openness; the certainty of the closed mainstream system was a special case of the 
more general open system, characterised by uncertainty. This system therefore had at its heart a 
‘method of expectations’, formed under uncertainty, within different time-frames. Time played a 
crucial role, understood in logical terms, referring to causal sequence, or in historical terms, both 
of which gave equilibrium meanings beyond the limited mainstream meaning of a solution to 
simultaneous equations. Further, because money had a special role in decision-making with respect 
to an uncertain future, monetary and real factors were to be treated in an integrated way. But, 
contrary to the reductionism of the mainstream approach, some of the analysis was to be conducted 
at aggregative levels without an explicit derivation from individual decision-making. In any case, 
again like Marshall, Keynes was conscious of the important role of the evolution (in historical 
time) of the social conventions and institutions which provide the framework for decision-making. 
Like Marshall too he was motivated to improve society. While he apparently separated off his 
social philosophy (consistent with J N Keynes’s normative-positive distinction) in advocating that 
the ‘economic problem’ be addressed first in order then to promote the Good Life, solving the 
economic problem itself involved moral judgements, e.g. about the need to prevent unemployment 
and the need for institutions to promote the public interest (Chick and Dow 2013). Economics was 
a moral science. 
 
Even though Keynes’s methodology was misunderstood when interpreted from the prevailing 
positivist standpoint of the mainstream, there was nevertheless a Keynesian methodological 
revolution from that perspective (i.e. within a narrow understanding of methodology) (Dow 2010). 
On the one hand Keynes sparked off the development of macroeconomic theory as a field distinct 
from microeconomics. On the other hand he provided the related impetus to the development of 
large data bases and econometric techniques to analyse them, and indeed provided an agenda for 
the development of econometrics in attempting to deal with the problems raised in his debate with 
Tinbergen. But Keynes had a more enduring impact among those who took his alternative 
methodology seriously, forming under the banner of Post Keynesianism with its distinctive 
methodology (Chick 1995). This approach includes Keynes’s typically Cambridge requirement 
for abstractions to take the form of simplification rather than fiction, with a view to allowing 
application to the more complex reality; for a focus on the passage of historical time with its 
implications for the uncertain basis for decision-making; and for aggregation to allow 
                                                          
16 Consistent with our characterisation of a Cambridge methodological tradition, Chick (2003: 311) characterises his 
theory of rational belief under uncertainty in terms of a ‘third way’. 
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macroeconomic analysis distinct from microeconomics, paving the way for analysis of growth and 
distribution.  
 
The literature on the Cambridge figures who contributed to this development is vast. Here we pick 
out just some of the important contributions specifically on methodology rather than theory of 
Keynes’s followers at Cambridge (the ‘Circus’) who perpetuated and developed aspects of his 
methodological legacy. Robinson (1962: ch. 4) pinpointed Keynes’s departure from the 
mainstream approach in terms of a shift in the subject matter to the capitalist system as a phase in 
history, bringing to the surface moral issues (with respect to the free operation of markets) and 
time. Keynes’s followers added to this a shift away from concern with the short period, where 
income distribution and power relations could be taken as given. Many of his followers in 
Cambridge were influenced also by Marx and his classical concern with distribution and economic 
processes over the long period analysed in class terms.  
 
Among the Circus, Joan Robinson made the most explicit methodological contribution. Her early 
book, Economics and Philosophy, had a particular impact in the 1960s when there was a receptive 
audience for a reflection on the foundations of economics. Her methodological stance shifted 
somewhat over her career (Harcourt 1996a, Salanti 1996). But, like Keynes, Robinson was 
concerned that economics address real issues, and take account of institutions (the ‘rules of the 
game’), and therefore that theoretical assumptions be simplifications rather than fictions. Like 
Keynes, too, her challenge to apparently false assumptions came more from her ontology than 
from specific empirical study. She also shared Keynes’s views about the uncertainty of knowledge 
and thus the impossibility of establishing economic laws. She made a particular contribution in her 
clear distinction between a logical-time framework, which aims to establish causal mechanisms, 
and an historical-time framework, which aims to establish irreversible processes such that 
equilibrium is a position to which a process tends in the long run.  
 
While Kaldor (1972) too criticised the ahistorical mainstream version of equilibrium, he also 
contributed to the methodological approach to evidence, developing the notion of stylised facts (as 
clarified and extended by Lawson 1989). Given the open nature of the economic system, detailed 
facts reflect a variety of tendencies at work under particular circumstances. By abstracting from 
this detail, stylised facts can form the basis of hypotheses. Here we see a version of the interaction 
of the mind with observed experience as a way of addressing the problem of induction, in the 
Newtonian/Smithian tradition. The Department of Applied Economics was established at 
Cambridge in 1945 to provide the empirical material on which such abductive reasoning could 
build.  
 
In some respects Robinson arguably at times adopted a position similar to that of J N Keynes: what 
Salanti (1996) refers to as ‘empirical apriorisim’.17 To the extent that she aimed her critique of the 
mainstream at the realism of assumptions and the internal consistency of its logic, she was 
implicitly accepting the underlying positivist methodology. This was perhaps most evident in the 
‘capital controversies’, where Robinson challenged mainstream marginalist analysis of value and 
production, such that the controversy came to be epitomised for many by the ‘reswitching’ problem 
which demonstrated that capital and its return need not be inversely related (Harcourt 1972). The 
                                                          
17 The continuing influence of J N Keynes may have been due in part to the fact the J M Keynes never produced a 
systematic account of his position on methodology. 
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fact that the force of this critique seemed not to be felt by the mainstream illustrates well the 
insufficiency of empirical apriorism as a methodology. In fact, while the debate was widely 
interpreted in the terms of the mainstream approach, the differences over capital theory arose from 
different ontologies and epistemologies. Robinson’s views on method were in fact changing as she 
moved away from Marshall’s influence and pursued the methodological implications of analysing 
a dynamic process over time. Robinson argued further that ideology was embedded in mainstream 
theory, contrary to professed mainstream methodology. While her efforts to strip it out have been 
seen by some to reflect a J N Keynesian view that ideology-free theory was indeed possible, 
Pasinetti (2008: 218) rather emphasises her position simply that ideological views need to be made 
explicit since economics was ideologically non-neutral.  
 
Other key contemporary figures in Cambridge were Michal Kalecki and Piero Sraffa, who both 
came to Cambridge from different methodological traditions. Both influenced others at Cambridge 
and spawned schools of thought developing their ideas within their distinctive methodological 
frameworks. Both focused on issues of production and distribution in historical time, influenced 
by Marx. Kalecki drew on empirical evidence, filtered through his careful conceptual classification 
of variables, in order to establish stylised facts with respect to the short period (such as all wages 
begin used up in consumption). Sraffa differed from Keynes and Kalecki in focussing on the long 
period and in presenting a formal mathematical system (rather than partial mathematical 
arguments). But, since the content was not marginalist, Sraffa’s mathematics were different from 
the mainstream calculus, employing the mathematics of the Classical period (Velupillai 2008). 
While the Ricardian tradition might seem to depart from both Malthusian and Post Keynesian 
methodology, Sraffa traced his concern with struggle over the surplus in historical time back to 
both Ricardo and Malthus (via Marx).18 This interpretation of Ricardo as not being so different 
from Malthus was distinguished by Dobb (1931, 1959) from Marshall’s version, which was arrived 
at through Mill (see further Harcourt and Kriesler forthcoming).  
 
The resulting strands of Post Keynesianism differ in part in terms of how much of the analysis was 
amenable to formal mathematical expression (echoing the debates between Malthus and Ricardo). 
But others have used formal mathematical models of the long-period which are more in the 
Marshallian tradition of specifying equilibrium in gravitational terms.19 There are nevertheless 
common elements to the methodologies emanating from the key Cambridge figures which are in 
accord with what we have identified as a Cambridge methodological tradition. Thus Pasinetti 
(1974: 43-4) identified common features between the Ricardian approach and J M Keynes’s 
methodology, while Dutt and Amadeo (1990) set out the common methodological ground between 
Post Keynesians and the neo-Ricardians who followed the Sraffian approach.20 Arestis, Dunn and 
Sawyer (1999) likewise identified the coherence of Post Keynesianism, in spite of its different 
strands, in terms of methodological approach. The rather vexed question of assessing differences 
relative to commonalities needs to be considered in terms of a pluralist, non-dualistic approach to 
epistemology. Phyllis Deane (1983) criticised Marshall and J N Keynes’s search for synthesis, 
advocating instead methodological pluralism. Her history of economic thought followed the 
                                                          
18 This reading of Ricardo implies that the methodological differences between him and Malthus were less marked 
than is implied by their own debate, or that the differences were more of degree than of kind, where the latter might 
characterise the differences between marginalist economics and Cambridge political economy. 
19 See for example Harcourt’s (2006: ch. 5) discussion of Marglin (1984). 
20 Note that their title is Keynes’s Third Alternative. 
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Cambridge tradition we have identified by focusing on methodology from the perspective of 
(analytical) economic history (Deane 1978). Like Robinson, she kept philosophical issues to the 
fore at a time when it reached a receptive audience.  
 
Geoff Harcourt’s history of economic thought also took a methodological perspective, charting the 
contributions of the ‘Circus’ (see e.g. Harcourt 2006 and Harcourt and Kerr 2009, and Harcourt 
1972 on the capital controversy). His own work has employed a pluralist methodology to theory 
development, governed by a close understanding of real circumstances and by policy concerns. He 
has made a particular contribution to methodology by articulating and justifying his ‘horses for 
courses’ approach whereby selections are made from a plurality of methods according to the 
problem at hand, rather than according to some internal requirement (Harcourt 1976b). In 
particular it involves a continuation of the Cambridge critique of the mainstream requirement to 
express all arguments in terms of formal deductive mathematics. The ‘horses for courses’ approach 
contributes to the increasing focus in heterodox economics on pluralist methodology, not as 
anything goes, but as an ontologically-grounded selection of methods (Lawson 1997b, King 2002).  
 
 
Cambridge contributions in the 21st century  
Many of the current strands of heterodox thought can be traced back in one way or another to 
Cambridge. Now heterodox economics involves a large world-wide community bound by a 
critique of monist adherence to mainstream methodology and the promotion instead of 
methodological pluralism. Although the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Cambridge is now 
almost exclusively mainstream, Cambridge has again been making a distinctive methodological 
contribution to heterodox economics in the form of critical realism as spearheaded by Tony 
Lawson (1997b, 2003) and developed by the Cambridge Social Ontology group.21 Critical realism 
encapsulates much of the Cambridge middle way tradition (while also, like earlier Cambridge 
contributions following J M Keynes, drawing on elements of the Marxian tradition). 
 
Critical realism is primarily a philosophical position, introduced by Lawson (1997b) as drawing 
on the philosophy of Roy Bhaskar, countering enlightenment (especially Humean) philosophy 
according to a positivist reading of it. But a reading of Scottish philosophy as providing a 
philosophical foundation for the Newtonian tradition, and developing it for the social sciences, in 
fact shows that it provides an alternative foundation for critical realism, and one which accords 
with the Cambridge tradition (Dow 2002). Critical realist philosophy puts the focus on the 
ontological level, on the grounds that any epistemic question requires reference to some position 
or other as to the nature of the subject matter; the focus is on devising theory by a methodology 
which best allows practical questions to be addressed, rather than by any internal criteria. One of 
the major achievements of critical realism is to have made this so explicit, such that it has become 
increasingly commonplace in heterodox economics to spell out the underlying ontological 
position.  
 
                                                          
21 Amartya Sen can also be interpreted as contributing to methodology in line with the predominant Cambridge 
tradition, with significant influence on current developments in economics. While his methodology is too large a 
subject to include here, see Martins’s (2013) detailed treatment. 
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The argument in favour of making ontology explicit is aimed at bringing to the surface the 
contradiction between the closed-system ontology implied by mainstream methodology and the 
common understanding of the economic system as being open – a modern version of the 
Cambridge position. For critical realists, a closed system ontology is defined in terms of event 
regularities which allow for identification of economic laws, which in turn allow prediction. An 
open system ontology refers to a subject matter which is evolving, including evolving internal 
relations, such that there are no uniformities to uncover and little scope for precise prediction. Real 
social systems are seen as being structured according to three levels: the actual, the empirical and 
the real. The aim of economic enquiry is to build up understanding of causal mechanisms operating 
at the (unobserved) real level, but if the system is open, this understanding takes the form of 
identifying tendencies which may or may not be operating, singly or together, in any one set of 
circumstances.  
 
The methodology for identifying tendencies is a development of the Cambridge middle way, 
eschewing the deduction/induction duality. Rather than seeking evidence in the form of repeated 
instances, critical realists seek to identify patterns, in the form of stylised facts, or partial 
regularities, or ‘demi-regularities’. This involves an application of the mind, employing for 
example metaphor, in order to ‘see’ patterns which might be indications of causal mechanisms for 
further investigation. Particularly revealing are contrastive demi-regularities, which suggest the 
presence of a causal mechanism in some circumstances but not in others. These mechanisms are 
to be investigated by means of methods suited to the subject area; this may include some type of 
formal mathematics if it can be justified as contributing to the analysis – a pluralist methodology.  
But the plurality of methodologies is seen as being limited to different research interests, while 
united by a shared open-system ontology and epistemology (Lawson 2003). Thus different schools 
of thought are distinguished by their particular subject matter of interest: gender, institutions, class, 
etc. Since social systems involve both power relations and moral conventions, ideology and moral 
judgements are part of the reality which economists analyse. Further, the purpose of critical realist 
economics is given as social transformation as a moral imperative. 
 
The presentation here of the contributions to methodology emanating from Cambridge has in fact 
been an exercise in the Cambridge methodological tradition that we have drawn out from the 
historical account. The topic was approached with some idea of the conceptual issues, and a pattern 
was then identified from general reading, in the form of the middle way methodological approach. 
But the expression of that approach differed between different circumstances, and continues to 
evolve. Also the consistency with which it has been applied was variable. In particular the 
influence of Marshall and J N Keynes (reflecting the dominance then of the Millian approach) 
constituted a divergence from the posited Cambridge tradition, and served to confuse the evolution 
of the revived tradition in Cambridge. Further the influence of all the major figures covered here 
is coloured by the different interpretations of them by readers coming from different 
methodological perspectives (including within Cambridge). While a tradition has been identified 
here as Cambridge’s important methodological contribution, this is inevitably a provisional 
judgement.   
 
 
 
 
15 
 
 References 
Arestis, P, Dunn, S P and Sawyer, M (1999) ‘On the coherence of Post Keynesian economics: a 
commentary on Walters and Young’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 46: 339-45. 
 Campanelli, G (2008) ‘Whewell, William (1799-1866)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 8. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 741-2. 
  
 Carabelli, A (1988) On Keynes’s Method. London: Macmillan. 
Chick, V (1983) Macroeconomics After Keynes: A Reconsideration of The General Theory. 
Oxford: Philip Allan. 
Chick, V (1995) ‘Is there a case for Post Keynesian Economics?’, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy 42 (1): 20-36. 
Chick, V (2003) ‘Theory, method and mode of thought in Keynes’s General Theory’, Journal of 
Economic Methodology 10 (3): 307-28. 
Chick, V and Dow, S C (2013) ‘Keynes, the Long Run and the Present Crisis’, International 
Journal of Political Economy, 42 (1): 13–25.  
Coates, J (1996) The Claims of Common Sense: More, Wittgenstein, Keynes and the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Colander, D (1992) ‘The Lost Art of Economics’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(3): 191-8.  
Comim, F (2002) ‘The Scottish Tradition in Economics and the Role of Common Sense in 
Adam Smith’s Thought’, Review of Political Economy 14 (1): 91-114. 
 
Comim, F (2006) ‘Adam Smith: Common Sense and Aesthetics in the Age of Experiments’, in A 
Dow and S Dow (eds), The History of Scottish Economic Thought. London: Routledge.  
 Creedy, J (2008) ‘Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1845-1926)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 2. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 733-47. 
  
 Cremaschi, S and Dascal, M (1996) ‘Malthus and Ricardo on Economic Methodology‘, History of 
Political Economy 28(3): 475-511. 
Deane, P (1978) The Evolution of Economic Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Deane, P (1983) ‘The Scope and Method of Economic Science’, Economic Journal, 93 (March): 
1-12. 
Deane, P (2008) ‘Keynes, John Neville (1852-1949)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 4. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 725-6. 
16 
 
Dobb, M H (1931) 'The Cambridge School', in E R A Seligman (ed.), Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences, 5. New York: Macmillan, pp. 368–71. 
 
Dobb, M H (1959) Wages (6th ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Dow, A, Dow, S, Hutton, A and Keaney, M (1998) ‘Traditions in Economics: The Case of Scottish 
Political Economy’, New Political Economy 3 (1): 45-58. 
Dow, S C (2002) ‘Historical Reference: Hume and Critical Realism’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 26 (6): 683-97. 
Dow, S (2010) ‘Was there a (Methodological) Keynesian Revolution?’, in B Dimand, R Mundell 
and A Vercelli (eds), Keynes’s General Theory After Seventy Years. London: Palgrave Macmillan 
for the International Economic Association, pp. 268-86. 
Dutt, A K and Amadeo, E J (1990) Keynes’s Third Alternative: The Neo-Ricardian Keynesians 
and the Post Keynesians. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Gerrard, B (1997) ‘Method and Methodology in Keynes’s General Theory’, in G C Harcourt and 
P Riach (eds), A ‘Second Edition’ of The General Theory, vol. 2. London: Routledge, pp. 166-202. 
Groenewegen, P (1995) A Soaring Eagle: Alfred Marshall 1842-1924. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Harcourt, G C (1972) Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Harcourt, G C ([1987]1992) ‘The legacy of Keynes; theoretical methods and unfinished business’, 
in D A Reese (ed.), The Legacy of Keynes. San Francisco: Harper & Row, pp. 1-22. Reprinted in 
C Sardoni (ed.), On Political Economists and Modern Political Economy: Selected Essays of G. 
C. Harcourt. London: Routledge, pp. 235-49. 
Harcourt, G C (1996a) ‘Some Reflections on Joan Robinson’s Changes of Mind and their 
Relationship to Post Keynesianism and the Economics Profession’, in M C Marcuzzo, L L 
Pasinetti and A Roncaglia, eds, The Economics of Joan Robinson. London: Routledge, pp. 317-
29. 
Harcourt, G C ([1996b]2001) ‘How I Do Economics’, in S G Medema and W J Samuels, eds, How 
Do Economists Do Economics Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 93-102. Reprinted in 50 Years a 
Keynesian and Other Essays. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 323-33. 
Harcourt, G C ([2003]2010) ‘The Cambridge Economic Tradition’, in J E King (ed.), The Elgar 
Companion to Post Keynesian Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 44-51. Reprinted in 
The Making of a Post-Keynesian Economist. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 201-10. 
Harcourt, G C (2006) The Structure of Post-Keynesian Economics. The Core Contributions of the 
Pioneers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
17 
 
Harcourt, G C and Kerr, P (2009) Joan Robinson. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Harcourt, G C and Kriesler, P (forthcoming) ‘Ricardo and Cambridge’, in J Courvisanos, J 
Doughney and A Millmow (eds), Heterodoxy in Economics: From History to Pluralism: Essays 
in honour of John E. King. 
Hartley, H (1931) ‘Michael Faraday and the theory of electrolytic conduction’, in British 
Association for the Advancement of Sciences Centenary Meeting. London: BAAS, pp. 3–21. 
Kaldor, N (1972) ‘The Irrelevance of Equilibrium Economics’, Economic Journal 82 (December): 
1237-55. 
Keynes, J M (1921) A Treatise on Probability. Collected Writings Vol. VIII. London: Macmillan, 
1973. 
Keynes, J M ([1933]1972) ‘Thomas Robert Malthus’, Essays in Biography. Collected Writings 
vol. X. London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society, pp. 71-108. 
Keynes, J M ([1935]1973) Letter to G B Shaw, 1 January. Collected Writings Vol. XIII, The 
General Theory and After Part I: Preparation. London: Macmillan, pp. 492-3. 
Keynes, J M ([1936]1973) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Collected 
Writings Vol. VII. London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society. 
Keynes, J M ([1938]1972) ‘My Early Beliefs’, Essays in Biography. Collected Writings vol. X. 
London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society, pp. 433-50. 
Keynes, J M ([1946]1972) ‘Newton, The Man’, Essays in Biography. Collected Writings vol. X. 
London: Macmillan, for the Royal Economic Society, pp. 363-74. 
Keynes, J N (1904) The Scope and Method of Political Economy. London: Macmillan. 
King, J E (2002) ‘Three Arguments for Pluralism in Economics’, Journal of Australian Political 
Economy 50 (December): 82-7. Reprinted in post-autistic economic review 23 (5), article 2, 2004. 
Kuehn, D (2012) ‘Keynes, Newton and the Royal Society: Events of 1942 and 1943’, Notes and 
Records: The Royal Society Journal of the History of Science, doi: 10.1098. 
Lawson, T (1989) ‘Abstraction, tendencies and stylised facts: a realist approach to economic 
analysis’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 13 (1): 59-78. 
Lawson, T (1997a) ‘Horses for Courses’, in P Arestis, G Palma and M Sawyer (eds), Markets, 
Unemployment and Economic Policy: Essays in honour of Geoff Harcourt, vol. 2. London: 
Routledge, pp. 1-15. 
18 
 
Lawson, T (1997b) Economics and Reality. London: Routledge. 
Lawson, T (2003) Reorienting Economics. London: Routledge. 
Loasby, B J (2003) ‘Closed models and open systems’, Journal of Economic Methodology 10 (3): 
285-306. 
Marglin, S A (1984) ‘Growth, distribution and inflation: a centennial synthesis’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 8: 115–44. 
Marshall, A N (1890) Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan. 
Martins, N (2013) The Cambridge Revival of Political Economy. London: Routledge. 
Meeks, J G T ([1976] 1991) 'Keynes on the Rationality of Decision Procedures under Uncertainty: 
the Investment Decision'. Marshall Library mimeo. Reprinted in J G T Meeks (ed.), Thoughtful 
Economic Man: Essays on Rationality, Moral Rules and Benevolence. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 126-60. 
Moore, G (2003) ‘John Neville Keynes's Solution to the English Methodenstreit’, Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought 25 (1): 5-38. 
Moore, G E ([1925]1959) ‘A Defense of Common Sense’, in J H Muirhead (ed.), Contemporary 
British Philosophy (2nd series). Reprinted in G E Moore, Philosophical Papers. London: George 
Allen & Unwin. 
Montes, L (2006) ‘Adam Smith: Real Newtonian’, in A Dow and S Dow (eds), The History of 
Scottish Economic Thought. London: Routledge. 
O’Donnell, R (1989) Keynes: Philosophy, Economics and Politics. London: Macmillan. 
Olson, R (1971) ‘Scottish philosophy and mathematics, 1750-1830’, Journal of the History of 
Ideas, 32 (1): 29-44. 
Pasinetti, L L (1974) Growth and Income Distribution: Essays in Economic Theory. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Pasinetti, L L (2008) ‘Robinson, Joan Violet (1903-1983)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 7. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 213-20. 
Pratten, S (1998) ‘Marshall on Tendencies, Equilibrium, and the State of Method’, History of 
Political Economy 30 (1): 121-64. 
Robinson, J (1962) Economic Philosophy. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Runde, J (1997) ‘Keynesian Methodology’, in G C Harcourt and P Riach (eds), A ‘Second Edition’ 
of The General Theory, vol. 2. London: Routledge, pp. 222-43. 
19 
 
Salanti, A (1996) ‘Joan Robinson’s Changing Views on Method: A Tentative Appraisal’, in M C 
Marcuzzo, L L Pasinetti and A Roncaglia, eds, The Economics of Joan Robinson. London: 
Routledge, pp. 285-99. 
Schultz, B (2008) ‘Sidgwick, Henry (1838-1900)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 7. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 467-70. 
Searle, J R (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Shackle, G L S (1974) Keynesian Kaleidics, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press. 
Shackle, G L S (1983) ‘A Student’s Pilgrimage’, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 
145: 107-16. 
Smith LRBL Smith, A ([1762-63] 1983) Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, edited by J C 
Bryce. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Snyder, A J (2006) Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society. Chicago: 
Chicago University Press. 
Velupillai, K V (2008) ‘Sraffa’s mathematical economics: a constructive interpretation’, Journal 
of Economic Methodology, 15 (4): 325-42. 
Waterman, A M C (1996) ‘Why William Paley was the “first of the Cambridge economists”’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 20: 673-86. 
Weintraub, E R (2005) ‘Roy Harrod: The Interwar Years’, History of Political Economy, 37 (1): 
133-55. 
Whitaker, J K (2008) ‘Marshall, Alfred (1842-1924)’, in S N Durlauf and L E Blume (eds), The 
New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, vol. 5. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 360-79. 
